Recent developments in kiobel vs. royal dutch petroleum: an important human rights forum in peril?  by Cantú Rivera, Humberto Fernando
Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional 
Núm. 28, enero-junio 2013
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN KIOBEL VS. ROYAL DUTCH  
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I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, KIOBEL AND ITS DEVELOPMENT  
BEFORE THE US SUPREME COURT
The Alien Tort Statute1 (Title 28 –referring to the Judiciary and Judicial 
Procedures—, §1350) is a disposition of the United States Code, enacted 
in 1789, that constitutes a recourse for alien citizens to bring tort actions for 
the violation of internationally recognized norms of customary law. Used 
since the 1980s to bring claims for violations of human rights committed 
abroad, it has become the most notorious judicial recourse worldwide for 
trying to hold corporations liable for their direct or indirect involvement 
in actions that have taken place in foreign countries and that could be 
qualified as severe violations of international law–specifically of human 
rights abuses and international crimes. The Alien Tort Statute is therefore 
1  “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States”.
*   Ph.D. candidate at Université Panthéon-Assas Paris II (France); Intern at the Spe-
FLDO3URFHGXUHV%UDQFKRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV2I¿FHRIWKH+LJK&RPPLVVLRQHUIRU+X-
man Rights (Geneva, Switzerland), and Coordinator of International Relations of the 
Human Rights Commission of the State of Nuevo Leon, Mexico, Conacyt Scholar.
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designed as a domestic civil responsibility remedy to address situations 
occurred in foreign soil and to obtain redress for the damages suffered.2
Despite many claims having been brought against corporations for al-
leged violations of international law, no case has ever been decided on its 
merits, basically due to settlements between the corporations and plain-
tiffs or for the courts deciding to decline jurisdiction to hear the cases. 
However, a claim brought by Esther Kiobel and others against Royal 
Dutch Petroleum and Shell has made its way to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, which has heard two arguments while discussing issues 
such as extraterritoriality and the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute 
to corporations.
Esther Kiobel, Individually and on Behalf of Her Late Husband, Dr. 
Barinem Kiobel, et al., Petitioners v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., 
registered under Docket 10-1491, is based on the alleged aiding and abet-
ting of Royal Dutch/Shell to the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria between 
1992 and 1995, which resulted in human rights violations committed in 
the Ogoni region of the Niger Delta by the Nigerian military, against 
twelve Nigerian human rights and environmental defenders. The abuses 
were alleged to be a widespread and systematic campaign of torture, ex-
trajudicial executions, prolonged arbitrary detention and indiscriminate 
killings, which constituted crimes against humanity executed to violently 
suppress the opposition of the locals against the oil operations of such 
corporations.3
This same situation had given way to other claims, such as Wiwa,4 
a case which was however settled between the parties before the trial 
started, without the corporation admitting responsibility for the crimes 
2  According to Clapham, there are no clear guidelines in international law in rela-
tion to corporate civil responsibility, since the main situations that have been addressed 
have been individual criminal responsibility and state civil responsibility. Therefore, he 
inclines to follow the developments of international law contained in the International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which leave open the possibility to 
encompass individual civil responsibility. Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights Obligations 
of Non-State Actors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 262 y 263.
3  Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, núm. 10-1491 (U.S. 
Supreme Court, June 6, 2011)
4  The Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell) case involved alleged violations of 
international law suffered by members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), in which Shell would have participated in complicity with the Nige-
rian military, providing them with logistical and transportation support, which was then 
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occurred, therefore using it to try to create an image of social responsibil-
ity and commitment.
Kiobel’s main controversy took place before the U.S. Court of Appeals 
of the Second Circuit, in which the main contention point was whether 
the Alien Tort Statute allowed victims to bring claims against corpora-
tions. The panel in the Court of Appeals held that the statute would not 
allow tort actions against corporations, basing their decision on the ar-
gument that international law only binds states and individuals, but not 
legal entities.5 However, the claim made its way into the Supreme Court 
of the United States of America due to the appeal by the plaintiffs, the last 
instance that will decide the reach and use of the Alien Tort Statute as a 
source of remedy for victims of human rights abuses worldwide.
II. MAIN ISSUES: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE APPLICATION  
OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE TO CORPORATIONS
The main issues that have been examined in Kiobel are extraterritori-
ality and the application of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations, which 
were the primary focus of the Court in the reargument of the case on Oc-
tober 1st, 2012.6
Regarding extraterritoriality, the attorney for the plaintiffs, Paul 
Hoffman, focused on three points: that it is national courts that imple-
ment international law and decide to what extent it is applied in their 
jurisdiction; that the international community —and in this case the 
European Union through its amicus brief— supports universal jurisdic-
tion, because of the jus cogens character of certain human rights norms 
and the interest of States in this regard to enforce their protection, as 
well as the fact that the ATS exercises adjudicative jurisdiction, which 
provides a forum to adjudicate international law claims; and that the EU 
also supports civil jurisdiction within universal jurisdiction, provided 
used by the military to execute some of its members, among other crimes, for their op-
position to the oil-exploration activities.
5   This argument will be analyzed below, in a contrary sense to the interpretation 
given to the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit.
6  The Court decided that the questions presented were whether the issue of corporate 
civil tort liability under the ATS is a merits question or an issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of 
nations or if they may be sued as any other private party defendant under the ATS.
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that the United States also accepts international opposition and exhaus-
tion of local remedies.
On the side of the respondents, Kathleen Sullivan stated in defense of 
Royal Dutch Petroleum that the United States of America objected to the 
notion of universal civil jurisdiction7 within the Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
for fear that American corporations abroad would be subjected to the 
same legal treatment for alleged violations of the law of nations. 
As well, she argued that by accepting jurisdiction under the ATS, they 
would be projecting the law of the United States onto foreign countries 
for actions that occurred within them, not in American territory —there-
fore not within the scope of its territorial jurisdiction—, potentially risk-
ing diplomatic friction with foreign sovereigns. Thus, the respondents 
argued that the ATS is a prescriptive jurisdiction that enacts regulations 
and projects them overseas for acts that would not normally give juris-
diction to any court other than that of the territory where the abuses were 
committed.
Several Justices of the Supreme Court, while interrogating the attor-
neys, made important remarks regarding their interpretation of how to 
approach KiobelDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVODZLQJHQHUDO¿UVWRI
all, Justice Scalia asserted that national courts are entitled to decide what 
constitutes a violation of international law, whenever said violation oc-
curs within their territory, hinting at the extra-limitation of the ATS and 
US law into foreign States, in which the US would not be in a position to 
determine if such actions constituted indeed a violation.
7  Shell contends that the ATS is not a valid exercise of universal jurisdiction, since 
States have only consented to universal criminal jurisdiction, not universal civil jurisdic-
tion. However, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court set forth in 
its article 75.2 that a convicted person may be ordered to pay the appropriate reparations, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, therefore including within the 
principle of universal jurisdiction a civil element destined to repair the damages caused 
by the actus reus)RUH[DPSOHWKH,&&LQLWV¿UVWMXGJPHQWPDGHFOHDUWKDWDFULPLQDO
penalty should be accompanied by its corresponding reparation to the victim; however, 
due to Thomas Lubanga’s economic position, this would not be possible (Decision es-
tablishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06, 
7 August 2012, paras. 131, 289.b). If as it is in this case, the defendant is a legal person 
with transnational commercial operations, reparation would be more feasible –and the 
PDLQW\SHRIUHGUHVVWKDWFRXOGEHJLYHQWRWKHYLFWLPVGXHWRWKHPDWHULDOGLI¿FXOW\LQ
imposing criminal sanctions on corporations.
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Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, seemed to incline to a position 
more favorable to having a case-by-case approach to universal jurisdic-
WLRQZKLOHUHÀHFWLQJRQWKHamicus EULHI¿OHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLV-
sion, mentioning that US tribunals could be forums by necessity when-
ever the alien had exhausted both domestic and international avenues 
in search for relief and redress. However, she also made remarks in the 
sense that no exhaustion of remedies had occurred in Kiobel, which 
would then waive the jurisdiction of American courts.
In an amici curiae by the former Special Representative of the Secre-
tary General (SRSG) for the issue of human rights and transnational cor-
porations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Professor Philip 
Alston and the Global Justice Clinic at the New York University School 
of Law, the amici stated that in his mandate as SRSG, he had found that 
international law does not generally require nor prohibit the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by states over corporations, therefore depend-
ing exclusively on domestic law and the existence of a recognized ju-
risdictional basis.8 Given that the Alien Tort Statute would comply with 
both characteristics mentioned in the brief, the extraterritorial application 
of the statute should not be dismissed merely on the basis that it violates 
international law, since there is no explicit standing on the subject, but 
rather a growing understanding that no such prohibition exists.
In relation to the application of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations, 
the discussion has mainly focused on the interrelation between interna-
tional criminal law and international human rights law, and the fact that 
the International Criminal Court doesn’t have jurisdiction over corpo-
rations or other legal persons. The main reference to this point in the 
reargument of Kiobel was brought in relation to the Convention against 
Torture by Justice Breyer, who tried to make the link between torture car-
ried out by a corporation under the Convention, re-directing his efforts 
after acknowledging that this international instrument does not address 
corporate responsibility, only State responsibility.
In her interventions before the Supreme Court, Kathleen Sullivan ar-
gued that according to the UN Special Representative on the issue of hu-
man rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
8   Amicus Curiae of John Ruggie, Philip Alston and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU 
School of Law, at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, núm. 10-1491 (U.S. Supreme 
Court, June 12, 2012) 
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in the current state of international law there would not be room or basis 
for corporate liability in relation to human rights abuses.9 However, the 
issue of the crime committed, and not precisely the author, came out in 
several occasions, being suggested that the pirates to whom the Alien 
Tort Statute referred when it was enacted in 1789 could very well be 
DGDSWHGWRWKHFXUUHQWUHDOLW\LQWKH¿JXUHVRIWRUWXUHUVRUDQ\RWKHUFULPL-
nal who violates internationally recognized customary law.10
However, in its amicus curiae brief with Philip Alston and the Global 
Justice Clinic, John Ruggie refuted the argument that the lack of a cur-
rent international body for adjudicating corporate responsibility for inter-
national crimes points to the fact that such responsibility does not exist, 
stating that ‘just as the absence of an international accountability mecha-
nism did not preclude individual responsibility for international crimes 
in the past, it does not preclude the emergence of corporate responsibility 
today.11 
On the contrary, the SRSG supported the notion that corporations might face 
criminal or civil liability depending exclusively on the implementation of inter-
national standards in domestic law, either through criminal dispositions or via 
the establishment of a civil cause of action.12
9  'HVSLWHWKH5HVSRQGHQWVODZ\HU¶VDI¿UPDWLRQWKH816SHFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYHRQ
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie, mentioned that his report was partially represented, indicating otherwise 
that there is a growing potential for corporate criminal liability in international law, which 
would be extended to companies for international crimes under domestic jurisdiction, 
UHÀHFWLQJ QHYHUWKHOHVV LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGDUGVVid. Ruggie, John G., Kiobel and Cor-
porate Social Responsibility, available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/ruggie-kiobel-and-corp-social-resonsibility-sep-2012.pdf
10   Justice Kagan referred to this situation while citing Sosa v. Filártiga (“For purpos-
es of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him, an 
enemy of all mankind”.), stating afterwards that under this precedent, “there were certain 
categories of offenders who were today’s pirates”. As well, Justice Breyer made several 
remarks in this sense: “If, when the statute was passed, it applied to pirates, the question 
to me is who are today’s pirates. And if Hitler isn’t a pirate, who is? And if, in fact, an 
equivalent torturer or dictator who wants to destroy an entire race in his own country is 
not the equivalent of today’s pirate, who is?” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26 and 
40, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-
1491rearg.pdf
11  Amicus Curiae of John Ruggie, Philip Alston and the Global Justice Clinic at NYU 
School of Law, at 7, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, núm. 10-1491 (U.S. Supreme 
Court, June 12, 2012).
12  Ibidem, pp. 7 y 8.
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Nevertheless, despite the application of the Alien Tort Statute to cor-
SRUDWLRQVEHLQJRQHRIWKHPDLQIRFDOSRLQWVLQWKH¿UVWDUJXPHQWRIKio-
bel before the Supreme Court, its approach was reduced drastically in 
IDYRURIWKHH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\DUJXPHQWGLVFXVVHGDERYH$¿QDOGHFLVLRQ
on the continuation of the Alien Tort Statute as a jurisdictional instrument 
for the protection of violations of international law —including interna-
tional human rights and customary law— is expected for March 2013.
Another important argument that was brought before the Supreme 
Court was that international law has only developed so far as to cover 
universal criminal jurisdiction, but not civil jurisdiction13 —a notion that 
would be contrary to several principles well established in international 
law, such as the universality of human rights or the responsibility to pro-
tect that derives both from international human rights law and humani-
tarian law, or of more recent developments such as the need to provide 
appropriate remedies for victims of human rights abuses (as stated in the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). However, article 75 
of the Rome Statute14 of the International Criminal Court, as well as legal 
scholarship have inclined to the position that universal criminal juris-
13  7KLVSRLQWKDVEHHQVWURQJO\GHIHQGHGLQWKHDPLFXVEULHI¿OHGE\-DFN*ROGVPLWK
in favor of Chevron, in which he mentions that “Under international law, a nation’s sov-
ereignty over activities within its territory is presumptively absolute, subject to excep-
tions by national consent. Nations […] have not, however, consented to allow a foreign 
court to entertain civil causes of action on the basis of universal jurisdiction, as is done in 
ATS cases”. Brief of Chevron Corporation, Dole Food Company, Dow Chemical Com-
pany, Ford Motor Company, Glaxosmithkline Plc, and the Procter & Gamble Company 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, núm. 
10-1491 (U.S. Supreme Court, February 3, 2012). Letnar ýHUQLþ, on the contrary, has 
mentioned that “Domestic courts may exercise universal jurisdiction for fundamental 
human rights violations. Most would agree that universal jurisdiction applies only to 
criminal cases; however, the concept is still undeveloped in the civil law sphere… There 
is some support for the extension of universal civil jurisdiction in relation to fundamental 
human rights that would be subject to universal criminal jurisdiction; …Although civil 
responsibility is less severe than criminal responsibility, it is superior to no individual or 
corporate responsibility at all, which remains the standard for most fundamental human 
rights norms. In this regard, it is argued that claims can be brought against corporations 
on the basis of civil jurisdictions in a growing number of national legal orders”. See 
Letnar ýHUQLþ, Jernej, Human Rights Law and Business: Corporate Responsibility for 
Fundamental Human Rights, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2010, pp. 158-160.
14  “Article 75(2). The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, com-
pensation and rehabilitation”. 
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diction would necessarily imply the existence of an accompanying civil 
remedy, or at the very least, it would not prohibit it, but explicitly allow 
for additional reparations to a criminal sanction.15
An important question that appears in respect of universal civil juris-
diction is whether States with no traditional connections to the criminal 
facts would be entitled to hear a claim, and more importantly, to award 
reparations to the victims of egregious human rights violations.16 An in-
teresting answer could be found in the developing principle of the re-
sponsibility to protect, which entails both a criminal and a civil dimen-
sion. The duty of protection of the State imposes inter alia the need to 
ensure that third parties do not infringe on the human rights of others, and 
when this happens, that the appropriate legal instruments exist to obtain 
redress for the damages suffered.
The protection of population —or the responsibility to protect— from 
international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity, would not just require that exemplary criminal sanctions be im-
posed to the perpetrators, but also that a reparation be directly awarded 
to the victims, which would also serve as a way to deter other persons 
—either natural or legal— to engage in such type of conduct.17 
Since there are no existing international mechanisms to address corpo-
rate responsibility for human rights violations, and only national orders 
could establish a jurisdictional basis to prosecute or allow for claims for 
human rights abuses committed outside of its jurisdiction, a case could 
15  “Universal jurisdiction is a permissive customary principle: states are permitted but 
not required to exercise universal jurisdiction”. Donovan, Donald Francis and Roberts, 
Anthea, “The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction”, American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 100, 2006, p. 143.
16  Even though universal criminal jurisdiction is well accepted and is considered as 
an established principle of international law, “plaintiffs and academics have increasingly 
invoked the concept of universal jurisdiction in considering whether civil remedies may 
serve as an independent or supplementary means of enforcing international law norms 
SURVFULELQJGH¿QHGFDWHJRULHVRIKHLQRXVFRQGXFW´Ibidem, p. 145.
17  “Although by tort claims private parties may seek vindication of private interests, 
MXGJPHQWV LQ WKHVHFDVHVDI¿UPPXFKZLGHU LQWHUHVWVPDQLIHVWHGLQ WKHQRUPV WKDW WKH
community is prepared to enforce. Punishment and compensation represent two distinct, 
but complementary, ways of condemning past, and deterring future, wrongdoing”. Ibi-
dem, p. 154.
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be made that the international community18 as a whole —and in this case, 
the judicial systems that are deemed best prepared or most effective for 
enforcing human rights rules— would have the responsibility to protect 
(or to ensure reparations in favor of) the population from said violations 
of international law, or at least not to interfere19 directly in the adjudica-
tion of reparations in favor of the victims made by other countries, since 
LWZRXOGEHLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIMXVWLFHDQGRIWKHIXO¿OOPHQWRIerga omnes 
obligations to protect and ensure redress to the victims.20
The responsibility to protect being incumbent on all States, this prin-
ciple of international law would support the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction —including universal civil jurisdiction— in order to guaran-
tee that the access to remedies is at reach of the victims of violations of 
international human rights law that could amount to international crimes.
III. TOWARDS THE DECEASE OF A HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM?
The Supreme Court of the United States is expected to decide in March 
2013 the future of tort actions brought against corporations in the United 
States judiciary, for actions that took place outside of its jurisdictional 
18  ³7KH¿UVWSURSRVLWLRQLVWKDWVWDWHVKDYHDUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFWWKHLURZQSRSX-
lations from mass atrocities…The second proposition of the «responsibility to protect» 
concept is that bystander states or the «international community» have not simply a right 
but a collective responsibility to assist host states in protecting their populations and to 
act to protect these populations in situations where the host state is manifestly failing to 
do so”. Glanville, Luke, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders”, Human Rights 
Law Review, vol. 12, núm. 1, 2012, pp. 3 y 4. 
19  Glanville considers, for example, that whenever a population is suffering serious 
harm as a result of state failure to protect its own citizens, due to unwillingness or inca-
pability of the State to halt it or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the in-
ternational responsibility to protect, even extraterritorially, and would therefore authorize 
legal intervention to ensure the corresponding reparations and punishment in a subsidiary 
basis. Ibidem, p. 10.
20  Donovan and Roberts argue that states should permit their courts to hear civil 
claims for extraterritorial violations of international law whenever the plaintiffs would 
face a denial of justice, if it is deemed that the judiciary of the country where the situation 
happened would not be able to enforce the corresponding international norms. See note 
15, p. 147. In the same sense, the Italian Court of Cassation found in Ferrini v. Germa-
ny that universal jurisdiction was applicable to civil proceedings based on international 
crimes, due to the peremptory nature of the norms proscribing such conduct (Ferrini v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 6 November, 2003, n. 5044, ss. 9).
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scope from a territorial perspective. Some of the Justices in Kiobel won-
dered if the fact that American jurisdiction is the most sought-after forum 
to bring claims for this type of abuses —or as they pointed out, that they 
are the only forum where such cases are brought to—, without there be-
LQJDVSHFL¿FJXLGHOLQHGHULYLQJIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZWKDWHVWDEOLVKHV
their universal civil jurisdiction, would not be in itself contrary to inter-
national law. 
Given the arguments exposed supra, the principle of the responsibility 
to protect and the fact that there is a clear indication that universal juris-
diction contains at least a civil element —if it doesn’t explicitly support 
it— to fully enforce judicially the international norms that have been 
universally recognized and are binding on all States, the Supreme Court 
should adopt a pioneer position in trying to encourage other jurisdictions 
to hear these type of claims, without foreclosing the possibility for plain-
tiffs to try to seek redress within its jurisdiction as a last resort. As stated 
by Justice Breyer in Sosa v. Alvarez Machain,21 universal civil jurisdic-
tion would not be more threatening than universal criminal jurisdiction, 
since both look to prosecute the same type of conducts and award the 
victims the corresponding reparations.
Some important cases have started appearing around the globe, with one being 
VSHFL¿FDOO\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IRU H[WUDWHUULWRULDO MXULVGLFWLRQ XQLYHUVDO FLYLO MXULV-
diction), and another one for the application of international law to corporations. 
Regarding universal civil jurisdiction, the case of Ashraf Ahmad El 
Hagog Jumaa v. Lybia is a remarkable example of a human rights claim 
brought under the jurisdiction of a country other than that were the facts 
happened, and without the existence of the traditional links to establish 
jurisdiction. In the case brought in The Netherlands, Mr. El Hagog —a 
Bulgarian national of Palestinian origin— claimed that he had been tor-
tured by Libyan civil servants to obtain a confession that he and oth-
er medical staff had deliberately infected 393 children with HIV, and 
thus sentenced to jail, from which they were released in 2007 after being 
granted pardon.
The Dutch civil court that heard the case awarded a compensation of €1 mil-
lion, a sum that the European Union and several of its member states are de-
manding of the Libyan authorities to pay. As well, in a communication brought 
before the Human Rights Committee in 2008, the United Nations treaty-body 
21  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 762, 763 (2004).
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concluded that the State party is under the obligation to provide the author with 
an effective remedy, as well as with the appropriate reparation, including com-
pensation.22 This case would therefore prove the possible emergence of univer-
sal civil jurisdiction, deriving from both the national courts as from the UN trea-
ty-body. As well, it would imply that probably the reluctance of national courts 
to hear extraterritorial cases could come to an end —in the interest of justice and 
the preservation of international peremptory norms and their enforcement—.
In relation to the case in which international law standards (and particularly 
the human right to health) have been applied to corporations, the case of Chev-
ron stands out as one in which an important transnational corporation has been 
convicted for damages to the environment,23 which have had direct effects on the 
right to health and others of the local communities surrounding Lago Agrio, in 
Ecuador. This case, a long and complex litigation process that has been stand-
LQJIRUDOPRVWWZHQW\\HDUVUHDFKHGD¿QDOYHUGLFWLQZKLFK&KHYURQZDVFRQ-
demned to pay $19 billion dollars24 by a local court in Ecuador. 
Using transnational litigation, the corporation tried to obtain an indictment in 
a federal court of the United States to avoid having their assets seized anywhere 
in the world, which was granted, but later overturned by the Second U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in New York, and afterwards rejected by the Supreme Court for 
consideration.25 Recently, however, the Ecuadorian court authorized the plain-
tiffs to seize approximately $200 million worth of assets that belong to Chevron, 
who will enforce the ruling by receiving $96.3 million that the Government of 
Ecuador owes to the corporation, as well as money held in Ecuadorean banks 
that belong to Chevron, and the licensing fees generated by the company’s trade-
PDUNVLQWKHFRXQWU\$VZHOOFODLPVKDYHEHHQ¿OHGLQRWKHUFRXQWULHVVXFKDV
Canada and Brazil, to try to enforce the Ecuadorean judgment.
This is a clear sign that there is a growing global belief in the need to make 
corporations around the world accountable for any violation of human rights 
22  Human Rights Committee, Communication 1755/2008, 19 March 2012, par. 10.
23  The damages that are claimed in the lawsuit were illnesses among locals due to the 
dumping of drilling waste in unlined pits by Texaco between 1964 and 1992, an accusa-
tion that Chevron has repeatedly denied after having bought Texaco in 2001.
24  The original sum was of $9 million dollars, which would double in case the com-
pany did not pay in the appropriate time that the Ecuadorian court had given it. In July 
2012, however, the sum reached $19 billions due to the corporation’s efforts to avoid 
enforcement of the judgment.
25  Chevron Corporation v. Hugo Gerardo Camacho Naranjo, et al., núm. 11-1428 
(U.S. Supreme Court, May 29, 2012).
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or international law that translates into damage to populations or the environ-
ment. An opportunity for the American judiciary appeared in Kiobel. However, 
it appears to be that the judicial system of the United States is going through 
an era of contraction, opposed to the once-enlarging judicial imperialism that 
characterized it, in a change that seems to lean closer to classic international law 
and which would normally be applauded were it not for the fact that it may be a 
regressive measure that can affect the universal implementation and respect for 
human rights.
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